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Abstract 
This paper provides an analysis of the pragmatic function of vague language use in everyday 
interactions in Ekegusii. The paper analyses the types of meanings conveyed by referring 
expressions such as: The plural “you” for singular reference, The inclusive “we”, The pronoun 
“they”, Down toners and Placeholders. The analysis applies Grice’s (1975) Cooperative 
Principle and Brown and Levinson’s (1987) Politeness Principle. The paper maintains that vague 
language is not a deviation from precision and clarity, but that it has a critical role that cannot be 
achieved through precise language. 
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1. Introduction 
It is commonly assumed that language, ideally, is precise and that vagueness is a deplorable 
deviation form of precision and clarity. Vagueness has been attributed to ignorance and absence 
of knowledgeability, and hence the usual reminders to speakers not to be vague. Vague language 
has not been appreciated as being crucial to everyday communication. However, contrary to the 
persuasive belief that vague language is to be avoided, vagueness is one of the essential and 
inescapable attributes of language. Vagueness is often the aspect of language that permits its 
flexibility in communication and its ability to perform social functions. Often speakers use vague 




language, not for lack of precise language to convey information accurately, but because they 
consider it more polite to make a less definite statement.  
Several linguists have argued in favor of vagueness in human language. Stubbs (1986) 
proposes that precise language is not necessarily more efficient than vague language. Williamson 
(1994) describes vagueness as a positive feature of human language:  
Used as a technical term, ‘vague’ is not pejorative. Indeed, vagueness is a 
descriptive feature of natural languages. Vague words often suffice for the 
purpose in hand, and too much precision can lead to time-wasting and inflexibility 
(p. 4869) 
Channell (1994) argues that “vagueness in language is neither ‘all bad’ nor ‘all good’. What 
matters is that language is used appropriately.” (p.3)  Jucker et al., (2003) propose that use of 
vague or precise language should be based on context. These authors argue, and correctly so, that 
some contexts require precise language, for example, in achieving the goals of a medical report, 
a legal contract, or an academic paper, a high degree of precision is ordinarily needed. However, 
the same type of precision from a politician, in a radio interview, or for partners during a casual 
chat would be counter-productive in that it might be off-putting and/or misleading. Channell 
(1994), concludes that speakers and writers tailor their language to make it suitable to the 
situation (when, where and why) and the linguistic context (is it gossipy chat, an interview, or a 
story in a popular paper?) 
Jucker et al., (2003) consider that the ability to vary the precision of utterances and to use 
them in appropriate contexts is part of the speakers’ communicative competence, and the 
interpretation of such expressions is a natural part of language use. They conclude that an 




understanding of the nature and the role of vagueness in language use is critical to an 
understanding of language itself. Arguing for an interactional approach to the concept of 
vagueness, they state the following: 
Vagueness is not only an inherent feature of natural language but also –and 
crucially-it is an interactional strategy. Speakers are faced with a number of 
communicative tasks, and they are vague for strategic reasons. Varying the level 
of vagueness may help guide the addressee to make the intended representation of 
entities and events and to draw intended implications from them (p.1739) 
Channell (1994) focuses on linguistic expressions that are, ‘purposely and 
unabashedly vague’ (p.20). She provides a comprehensive description of various ways of 
approximating quantities in English to various ways of referring vaguely to categorize 
(e.g., with tags such as ‘or something like that’) and of totally vague words such as 
‘thingy’ or ‘thingummy’ and ‘whatsit’. 
In this paper, we explore the contexts and meanings of vagueness in everyday conversation 
among speakers of Ekegusii. We will also attempt to determine ways in which vague expressions 
are not just poor but good-enough substitutes for precise expressions, but preferable to precise 
expressions because of their greater efficiency (Sperber and Wilson 1995 p. 45-48). 
1.1 Theoretical Grounding for Pragmatic Functions of Vague Language 
In this paper, we make use of the theory of conversational implicature first promulgated by 
Grice (1975) and since then refined and developed by among many others (Brown & Levinson 
(1983). According to Channell (2003), Grice’s theory of implicature assumes that conversation is 




a cooperative venture, and that speakers adhere to the Cooperative Principle (CP). In accordance 
to this principle, speakers try to send understandable communicative messages within the context 
of any particular conversation, and hearers assume that speakers are doing this. The Cooperative 
Principle involves both parties knowing and using four rules of conversation. Grice called these 
rules maxims and outlines them as follows: 
1. The maxim of quality (be truthful according to the evidence you have) 
2. The maxim of quantity (be informative, but not over-informative) 
3. The maxim of relevance (be relevant to the conversation) 
4. The maxim of manner (say things clearly, unambiguously, briefly) (Grice, 1975: cited in 
Channell (1994 p. 33) 
Channell cites two ways in which maxims are relevant to vague language. First, vague 
expressions may be used to enable speakers to follow these maxims. She gives as an example of 
the answer she could give, asked what time she would expect to be home from work. Since she 
cannot anticipate the workload or traffic, the most truthful reply for which she would have 
evidence would be “about six o’clock”. From this, the hearer would infer that she could not say 
exactly what time she would be home.   
The second way in which the Cooperative Principle could be of interest in the study of vague 
expressions is that they are often used when one of the maxims is flouted. Grice explained that in 
conversations, speakers very often break rather than follow one or more maxims. When they do 
this, specific effects are created for hearers, which he called implicatures. The use of 
conversational maxims shows that vague expressions are devices speakers use to tailor their 
contribution in order to give the right amount of information for the purpose of the conversation. 




The second theory that has been used for the analysis is the Politeness Principle. Politeness as 
a linguistic theory was first systematized by Brown & Levinson (1987).  Brown & Levinson 
assume that all competent adult members of a society are concerned about their face, the self-
image they present to others, and that they recognize other people have similar face wants. They 
distinguish two aspects of ‘face’ which they claim are universal and refer to two basic desires of 
any person in any interaction: ‘negative face’ and ‘positive face’. The former is a person’s desire 
to be unimpeded by others, to be free to act without being imposed upon. The latter is a personal 
wish to be desirable to at least some other who will appreciate and approve of one’s self and 
one’s personality. ‘Positive face’ is fundamentally determined by the culture and by the social 
group to which the participant belongs; it is ultimately of an idiosyncratic nature. 
Brown & Levinson (1987) say that face is something that is emotionally invested and that it 
can be lost, maintained or enhanced and must be constantly attended to in interaction. Since 
one’s own face can only be sustained by the actions of others, these authors claim it is in 
everyone’s interest to cooperate in order to maintain each other’s face. The politeness theory has 
been used in the analysis of referring expressions: the use of plural ‘you’ for singular reference, 
the inclusive ‘we’ and ‘they’ as devices for back-grounding the agent. 
2. Analysis 
In the analysis below, we identify the types of meanings conveyed by the vague expressions in 
Ekegusii and the role their meanings play in conversations.  
2.1 Referring Expressions 




It is often the case that speakers use vague expressions and vary them in accordance with their 
purposes. The common referring expressions are those that make use of personal pronouns such 
as the plural ‘you’, the inclusive ‘we’, and ‘they’ . Consider, for example the following extracts: 
2.1.1 The use of ‘you’ 
Speaker A and speaker B are husband and wife respectively. Speaker A has just arrived home 
from a week’s journey and only to discover that a neighbor’s plough that he had borrowed and 
had wanted returned to the owner is still lying in the house. The speakers use the vague 
expression ‘you’ for various reasons:  
           A: Naki motarairera Mokaya obokombe bwaye? 
Why have you not returned Mokaya’s plough to him? 
 
B: Ngwatotebeti toiranie gaki? 
Did you really tell us to return it? 
A: Timbatebeti? O igo nebete rirorio 
I did not tell you? Oh! I must have forgotten then 
B: Aye inchwo gaki omoirere bwango  
You, please come and take it to him quickly 
 
The second person pronoun ‘you’ has been used in three different ways in this exchange. 
First, speaker A, who is the husband has used the plural ‘you’ for singular reference. Among the 




Ekegusii speakers, the plural ‘you’ is used as a face-saving strategy in an asymmetrical 
relationship. The husband uses it to avoid putting blame squarely on the wife when things have 
gone wrong in the home. Singular ‘you’ is direct and confrontational and it is avoided in order to 
maintain social harmony. The wife on the other hand uses singular ‘you’ which is more direct to 
indicate that the husband is to blame for not informing them that the plough needed to be 
delivered to the owner. Speaker B uses the first person plural us implying that the task could 
have been done by anyone in the family and not necessarily by her. Her use of the direct pronoun 
you is however not confrontational because she does not express her protest with finality. Instead 
she expresses it tentatively as a question. This may be seen as a redress for what would appear as 
blame on the husband for failure to give instructions to deliver the plough.  
The pronoun ‘you’ has also been used as a vocative in this exchange. Speaker A refers to his 
wife as ‘you’ and not by her name or by any endearing expressions such as darling, honey or 
sweetheart. In a context where neither the spouses’ first name nor any endearments are 
comfortably acceptable in private or in public, the vague expression ‘you’ is the preferred 
vocative. Some speakers address each other by their first-born child’s name, but whenever the 
spouse is far, their attention is drawn by use of the vocative ‘you’. 
2.1.2 The ‘inclusive we’  
The inclusive ‘we’ may be used in discourse in reference to the speaker and the hearer (you) or 
to a third person (he/ she). In the following scenario, speaker A and B have just come out of 
church where the sermon was about the Christian’s responsibility over the poor. Speaker A is a 
very active community- service leader of the church who has done a lot to help the poor in the 
community. However, in her interaction she makes her observations using the inclusive ‘we’. 
A: Twabeire abasiereriamono 




We have become very negligent  
B: Ninki? 
What is it? 
A: Twangire gokonya abataka egati yaito 
We have refused to help the poor among us. 
Speaker A uses the inclusive ‘we’ to avoid taking a ‘holier than thou’ attitude towards the 
issue of neglect for the poor in her church. The use of the inclusive ‘we’, shows that she accepts 
the inescapable responsibility of the church over the poor. The speaker in this way does not just 
blame the addressee and other church members but presents herself as equally to blame for the 
neglect. The inclusive we here functions as a face-saving device by which speaker A criticizes 
the addressee and the rest of the church members without excluding herself even though she has 
done a lot for the poor herself. 
Another use of the inclusive ‘we’ is in the following scenario where two women A and B are 
in conversation when they see another woman they do not like. Their use of the inclusive we has 
a meaning and function completely different from the one discussed above.  
A: (Winking at B) Noroche buna twaswagire? 
   Do you see how we have put on weight? 
B: (Laughing sarcastically) Inki eke tokarekoria? 
What could we be eating? 
The inclusive ‘we’ functions as an in-language, providing the two speakers a way of talking 
about someone else without the individual realizing that they are the subject of gossip. The use 
of the inclusive ‘we’ flouts the maxim of quality since the speakers are apparently telling a lie as 
what they say does not refer to them. However, the hearer can draw a conclusion from what they 
do not say by using partly what they say, the context in which they say it, and the shared 
knowledge between the speakers and the hearer. 
2.1.3 The pronoun ‘they’ 




The pronoun ‘they’ has no unique reference. For instance, speaker A and B are a lower primary 
school child and the parent respectively. Speaker A has just arrived home for lunch and is 
reporting what she has been sent to take to school the following day. 
A: Igo bateba toire chibesa chiamatemwa mambia 
   They  said that we  take the examination fees tomorrow. 
B: Barabi bateba? 
    Who( plural) said? 
A: Omwarimu 
The teacher 
Children use the pronoun ‘they’ which is often equivalent to an agent-less passive. This 
enables them to talk about people whom they think are more powerful than them without 
mentioning their names. The child knows it is the teacher who has sent for examination fees, but 
she uses the vague expression ‘‘they’ to express the idea of “ them versus us”: those in  authority 
versus those without. In the following scenario, speak B is talking to speaker A who has 
observed that he comes late from work every day. 
A: Ninki gekogera okonyorwa korwa egasi kera rituko? 
Why are you always late from work every day? 
 
B: Igo bagotoa egasi enyinge rakini mbari gotoakana obataemu 
They give us too much work but they do not pay us overtime 
 
 B is disgruntled about the terms and conditions of his job, but he is not in a position to 
complain directly to the management. The vague expression ‘they’ therefore allows him to talk 
about his frustration without specifically mentioning names of those frustrating him. ‘They’ is 
pervasively used in the ‘them’ and ‘us’ references where the ‘them’ are in authority and are 
perceived as more powerful than ‘us’. 





Speakers try to avoid the force of the verb or the adjective by using a variety of vague 
expressions that have a lowering effect. Downtoners include such expressions as ‘kind of’, ‘sort 
of’, ‘rather’ and ‘a bit’ which have a slight lowering effect. The extract below illustrates the use 
of a downtoner. Speaker B is sick, but she does not want her children and husband to know this 
or to grasp the full magnitude of her condition. Speaker A is her six-year old child. 
A: Mama igo orwarete? 
Mom are you sick? 
 
B: Ee igo ndwarete ake igo. 
Yes I am a bit sick 
 
Speaker B uses the downtoner ‘a bit’ as an understatement of her sickness in order to avoid 
alarming her children and her husband. Unlike men, women avoid appearing too sick or too tired 
for fear that this may alarm the husband and the children. In this example the speaker gives less 
information than is required. The vague expression is to be preferred in this context as precise 
and direct language is likely to frighten.  
In the following extract speaker A has made a complement to speaker B about how neat her 
house looks. 
A: Enyomba yao ekororekana buya! 
Your house looks neat! 
 
B: Ee, ake igo gaki. 
Yes, Just a little bit  
Speaker B minimizes the complement by saying that her house looks just a little neat. This 
scaling down of a complement is appropriate among Ekegusii speakers so that one does not give 
an impression of being conceited. Total acceptance of a complement gives an impression that 




one is better than the others in the conversation and thus threatens solidarity, creating an 
asymmetrical relationship between them.  
A third instance in the use of a downtoner is as in the following scenario: Speaker B has been 
doing a piece of contract work for speaker A and Speaker A is trying to find out what  B thought 
of the  task: 
A: Naki egasi yarenge? 
How was the work? 
 
B: Nenkong’u ake 
It is a little bit hard  
Speaker B describes the work as ‘a little hard’ which gives an impression that it is easier than 
if described simply as hard. A full evaluation of the work may have been face-threatening to the 
giver of the contract as it might portray him as inconsiderate.  
The use of a bit  which  is   a hedge   is  a politeness strategy that reduces the force of face-
threatening speech act that would result from the use  of the  precise word hard. The  force of  a 
precise  language  utterance here would be  a complaint or a criticism, but this has  been softened 
by the use of the  downtoner  a bit.  
2.3 Placeholder words 
These are words that convey no referential content in themselves but instead they invite the 
listener to infer a referent (Jucker et al., 2003 p. 1794).  Crystal and Davy (1975) observe that 
these words express total vagueness (p. 12). Speakers may use placeholders because they do not 
know appropriate words/names or they are not able to access the exact names or words at the 
moment of speaking. Channell (1994) also suggests that a person who has access to an 
appropriate name may prefer to use a placeholder in order to avoid using an offensive or taboo 




word (p.16). Jucker et al (2003) observe that the pragmatic meaning of these terms is more 
crucial than their semantic meaning. (p.1794). Jucker et al further state that in situations in which 
the speaker cannot access a name, use of a placeholder word may allow the speaker to maintain 
the place of the conversation. In the example below, the speaker, who is an elderly man trying to 
watch a new TV program in his son’s house, uses the placeholder for one or both of the above 
mentioned reasons: 
 A: Ekwerende eye tebwati bipindi biya bono.   
This thingy does not have interesting programs now.  
 
The speaker uses the placeholder because he cannot remember the word TV. The placeholder 
allows the speaker to maintain the conversation even without the proper name of the object. The 
following excerpt shows that a placeholder can also be used for another purpose. Speaker A is 
talking to B who reminds him of a person he would rather forget, and this is their talk. 
A: Konye momenyete na Mbeche. Ngai achiete omenyete aye bweka rero? 
You have been staying with Mbeche before. Where did he go and how come you 
are alone now? 
B: Takong’inyoria rikwerende riria ranyibera ebinto biane rigatama? 
               Please don’t remind me of that what’sthename who ransacked my house and 
took away with my stuff. 
 
Speaker B uses a placeholder even though he knows the name of the person he is talking 
about. The speaker uses the placeholder in this context to express his negative attitude towards 
the person he is talking about. His name is just not worth mentioning and he hates to be 
reminded of the person. 
Channell (1994) suggests that a speaker who has access to an appropriate name may prefer to 
use a placeholder in order to avoid using an offensive or taboo word, being derogatory, being 




pretentious, or rewarding pronunciation problems ( p. 162). For instance, speaker A and speaker 
B are walking along a footpath with so many other people. Speaker A notices some faeces along 
the way and cautions speaker B to be careful not to step on it. 
A: Rigereria buya totacha amakwerende ayio. 
Be careful not to step on the thingummy. 
This placeholder serves a euphemistic function here since mention of faeces is regarded as 
verbal taboo. In the following scenario, the placeholder serves yet another function. Speaker A 
has noticed that speaker B’s zip is loose. He uses a placeholder to pass the information as 
follows: 
A: Bunga ekwerende yao 
Fasten your thingy 
Speaker A uses the placeholder to pass confidential information to B without attracting 
unnecessary attention from other hearers. 
Placeholder words play a significant role in Ekegusii as they allow speakers to maintain the 
conversation when they either do not know or they have forgotten the name of the person or 
object they want to talk about. Speakers also use placeholders to express their attitudes towards 
the object or person they are talking about. Placeholders serve a euphemistic function, enabling 
speakers to avoid mentioning taboo or offensive words. Finally, placeholders may be used for 
confidentiality when only the speaker and the hearer have the knowledge necessary for their 
interpretation. 
3. Conclusion 
Vague expressions are persuasive in everyday conversations. They are not a deviation from 
precise language. Rather, they serve a variety of functions in the contexts in which they are used. 




There are several reasons why speakers use vague expressions. First, these expressions enable 
speakers to carry on with a conversation when they either do not know a word or they cannot 
access it in time. In some cases, speakers may, even when they know and can access a word, opt 
to use a vague expression in order to avoid using a precise word that is perceived to be taboo or 
offensive. Vague expressions may also serve a social function where they may serve as 
politeness strategies, helping to tone down a complaint or criticism. The interpretation of the 
expression requires a common knowledge between the speaker and the hearer. 
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